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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated the need for a global macro-prudential approach to
supervision and regulation of the financial sector. The traditional (micro) focus on the soundness
of individual financial institutions proved to be insufficient in limiting volatility and the spreading
of vulnerabilities from one financial institution to another. Hence, the new emphasis on the design
of macro-prudential policies that lean against the financial cycle and aim at maintaining a “stable
provision of financial intermediation services to the wider economy [...] to avoid the type of boom
and bust cycles in the supply of credit and liquidity that has marked the recent financial crisis.”1
However, little is still known about macro-prudential policies, how they should be implemented
and their potential gains. This paper contributes to the current debate on the implementation and
effectiveness of macro-prudential tools by evaluating policies that make the Loan-to-Value (LTV
henceforth) ratio respond to macroeconomic conditions and vary in a counter-cyclical manner. We
compare the effectiveness of such policy tools against more traditional policies, such as interest rate
rules that respond to financial variables.
For this analysis we rely on the model of the housing market developed by Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) and extended by Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) to incorporate expectations-driven
cycles. Changes in expectations about future economic conditions are plausible sources of optimism
on future house price appreciation that generate boom-bust cycles characterized by co-movement
in house prices, GDP, consumption, investment, household’s debt and hours worked as in the data.
Expectations that lead to macroeconomic booms distort consumption and investment plans. Their
sudden reversals have negative effects on economic and financial decisions that transmit across
sectors and generate macroeconomic instability.
The goal of this paper is to assess alternative policies in terms of their effectiveness in mitigating
boom-bust cycles and macroeconomic volatility and their impact on welfare. We first consider
whether standard monetary policy, i.e. in the absence of macro-prudential goals, can contribute
to making boom-bust cycles in credit and housing prices less severe. We find that strict inflation
targeting delivers high volatility of both housing prices and the loan-to-GDP ratio and is detrimental
to welfare relative to an estimated rule. In fact, a strict anti-inflationary stance generates high
volatility of the real interest rate that, in the presence of nominal debt contracts, implies a great
deal of wealth redistribution between lenders and borrowers. Hence, a policy that completely
stabilizes inflation is severely suboptimal compared to a more moderate anti-inflationary stance
1See Bank of England, The role of macro-prudential policy, discussion paper November 2009.
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such as an estimated Taylor-type rule. Thus, monetary policy cannot stabilize inflation completely
and eliminate boom-bust cycles. We also consider a monetary policy that responds to expected
inflation, but we find that this yields only marginal gains in terms of stabilization relative to a
Taylor-type rule that targets current inflation.
There is an ongoing debate over whether the monetary authority should react to financial
variables to avoid bubbles in asset prices and large variations in credit. Our paper analyzes interest-
rate rules that respond to either credit growth or housing price growth. The information content of
credit aggregates is such that an interest-rate rule that responds to credit growth mitigates boom-
bust cycles and macroeconomic volatility. We document that responding to credit growth reduces
the amplitude of booms, avoids the occurrence of busts, and is, thus, welfare improving.
We also consider macro-prudential policies aimed at containing boom-bust cycles in credit and
housing prices. We define macro-prudential policy as the use of the LTV ratio as a policy tool. We
study whether counter-cyclical LTV ratio policies can be effective in providing a stable supply of
financial intermediation, i.e. loans, to the household sector so as to avoid spill-over to the macro-
economy. The effectiveness of alternative macro-prudential policies is measured both in terms of
the volatility of the debt-to-GDP ratio and the welfare of the agents in the model. We investigate
the implications of counter-cyclical LTV rules that respond to output growth, credit growth, and
housing prices growth. We find that LTV rules responding to credit growth are the only policies
leading to a Pareto improvement relative to the benchmark policy. Counter-cyclical LTV rules are
effective in mitigating boom-bust cycles in housing prices and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Reducing
LTV ratios and thereby tightening financial conditions during the boom phase while raising LTV
ratios and allowing for easier access to credit during the bust phase is an effective policy to keep
credit stable in response to shocks and news.
Next we compare LTV-ratio policies and interest-rate rules that target macro-prudential goals.
Compared to interest-rate rules that respond to financial variables, counter-cyclical LTV ratios
are more effective in stabilizing households’ debt, debt-to-GDP, and inflation. According to the
welfare criterion borrowers prefer LTV rules because they benefit from the more stable supply
of credit generate by active macro-prudential policy. Lenders, on the other hand, are better off
under an interest-rate rule that responds directly to credit growth and more effectively stabilizes
consumption. Hence, welfare heterogeneity precludes an unanimous ranking of these alternative
policies.
This paper is related to two recent strands of the business cycle literature, one on asset price
bubbles and monetary policy and the other on macro-prudential policy. The literature on asset-price
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movements and monetary policy relies mostly on models of exogenous bubbles, as in Bernanke and
Gertler (2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002). In these models, the market price of an asset is the
sum of its fundamentals implied by competitive equilibrium and an exogenous bubble component
that stochastically emerges and disappears over time. Since the insurgence, size and burst of the
bubble are exogenously determined, these models do not allow for any feedback from the conduct
of monetary policy to the occurrence and the magnitude of boom-bust cycles in asset prices. Thus,
unless asset prices signal changes in expected inflation, an anti-inflationary monetary policy is
generally optimal in such environments.2 Cecchetti et al. (2000) analyze rules that minimize a
weighted sum of output and inflation variability to find that macroeconomic stabilization can be
improved by adjusting the interest rate also in response to asset price misalignments. Christiano,
Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2008) introduce expectations on future productivity as a source of
fluctuations in asset prices in a model a` la Bernanke et al. (1999). When they add credit growth
to the interest-rate rule, the equilibrium response of the economy to news shocks is nearly optimal.
Our paper differs from these contributions in a number of ways. It analyzes optimal monetary
policy in the presence of booms and busts in housing where boom-bust cycles arise in response
to expectations of future changes not only about productivity but also about other shocks, such
as monetary policy.3 Lastly, we additionally consider macro-prudential policy and compare the
effectiveness of interest-rate rules against LTV rules both in terms of welfare and in smoothing
macroeconomic and financial cycles.4
A recent literature investigates the design and implementation of macro-prudential policy in
models of the housing market.5 Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2010) use ad-hoc loss functions to show
that, compared to capital requirement rules, LTV rules are more effective in reducing the variability
of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2009) document that macroeconomic tools
may be useful to mitigate the impact of financial shocks. However, they find no role for macro-
prudential policy in booms generated by higher productivity. Unlike these contributions, our paper
2As it is optimal in standard models with nominal stickiness like in Woodford (2003), Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2006).
3Using simplified versions of the model of the housing market adopted in this paper that abstract from boom-bust
cycles dynamics, Monacelli (2006) and Mendicino and Pescatori (2008) highlight the optimality of a certain degree
of inflation volatility. These two studies analyze the Ramsey equilibrium and optimal simple rules, respectively.
4For some recent papers on optimal monetary policy and asset prices, see Faia and Monacelli (2006), Gilchrist
and Saito (2006), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007).
5See Angeloni and Faia (2010) for macro-prudential policy in a model with credit frictions at the firm level but
without housing.
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evaluates policies in response to a richer stochastic structure that allows for both current and
expected shocks and is consistent with boom-bust dynamics in house prices. Most importantly, our
paper compares policies in terms of their welfare implications.
Since Beautry and Portier (2004, 2007) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), several contributions
have highlighted the importance of expectations-driven cycles as a source of business cycle fluctu-
ations. We do not review this literature, but rather focus on the contributions that are closer to
our paper. Among others, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) document that news on future neu-
tral productivity shocks, investment-specific shocks, and government spending shocks account for a
sizable fraction of aggregate fluctuations in postwar United States. Christiano et al. (2008) shows
that expectations about future productivity can be a plausible mechanism to generate stock-market
boom-bust cycles. Milani and Treadwell (2010) consider expectations on the policy rate and find
that anticipated policy shocks play a larger role in the business cycle than unanticipated ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the model and section 3
describes the method used for conducting welfare analysis. Section 4 and 5 investigate interest-rate
and LTV rules, respectively. Section 6 compares interest-rate rules and macro-prudential policy, as
represented by LTV rules. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we briefly describe the model economy. We consider an economy populated by
households, producers of final goods for consumption and investment purposes, a continuum of
retailers, housing producers and a central bank. The framework follows Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
and Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010).
Households. The economy is populated by two types of households: the Saver and the Bor-
rower. They both work in the production of consumption goods, n
′
c,t, and housing, n
′
h,t, consume,
c
′
t, and accumulate housing, h
′
t. They differ in their discount factor, (β and β
′
). Borrowers (denoted
by ′) feature a relatively lower subjective discount factor that in equilibrium generates an incentive
to anticipate future consumption to the current period through borrowing. Hence, the ex-ante
heterogeneity induces credit flows between the two types of agents. This modeling feature has been
introduced in macro models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended by Iacoviello (2005) to a
business cycle framework with housing investment.
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The Borrower maximizes the utility function:
Ut = Et
∞∑
t=0
(β
′
GC)t
[
Γ
′
c ln (c
′
t − ε
′
c
′
t−1) + j ln h
′
t −
τ
1 + η′
((n
′
c,t)
1+ξ
′
+ (n
′
h,t)
1+ξ
′
)
1+η
′
1+ξ
′
]
subject to the budget constraint:
c
′
t + qt
[
h
′
t − (1− δh)h
′
t−1
]
− b′t
≤ w
′
c,tn
′
c,t
X
′
wc,t
+
w
′
h,tn
′
h,t
X
′
wh,t
− Rt−1b
′
t−1
pit
We allow borrowers to collateralize the value of their homes.
b
′
t ≤ mEt
qt+1pit+1h
′
t
Rt
. (1)
Except for the gross nominal interest rate, R, all the variables are expressed in real terms; pit is
gross inflation (Pt/Pt−1), w
′
c,t and w
′
h,t are the wages paid in the two sectors of production, and qt
is the price of housing in real terms. Houses depreciate at rate δh and j determines the relative
weight in utility on housing services. Limit on borrowing is introduced through the assumption
that households cannot borrow more than a fraction, m, of the next-period value of the housing
stock. The borrowing constraint is consistent with standard lending criteria used in the mortgage
and consumer loan markets. Households set wages in a monopolistic way. Xwc,t and Xwh,t are
markups on the wages paid in the two sectors. Wages are adjusted subject to a Calvo scheme with
a given probability every period.
The Savers choose how much to consume, to work and to invest in housing facing a similar
problem. However, they also invest in capital and receive the profits of the firms. Investment-
specific technology shocks, Ah,t, are assumed to affect capital investment in the goods-sector.
Firms. Final good producing firms produce non-durable goods (Y) and new houses (IH). Both
sectors face Cobb-Douglas production functions. The housing sector uses capital, kh, land, l,
intermediate inputs, kb, and labor supplied by the savers, n, and the borrowers, n
′
, as inputs of
production.
IHt =
(
Ah,t
(
nαh,t + n
′ 1−α
h,t
))1−µh−µb−µl
(zh,tkh,t−1)µhk
µb
b l
µl
t−1,
The non-housing sector produces consumption and business capital using labor and capital, kc.
Yt =
(
Ac,t
(
nαc,t + n
′ 1−α
c,t
))1−µc
(zc,tkc,t−1)µc .
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Ah,t and Ac,t are the productivity shocks to the housing- and goods-sector, respectively. Firms
pay wages to households and repay rented capital to the Savers. Retailers, owned by the Savers,
differentiate final goods and act in a monopolistically competitive market. Prices can be adjusted
with probability 1−θpi every period, by following a Calvo-setting. Monopolistic competition occurs
at the retail level, leading to the following forward-looking Philips curve:
lnpit − ιpilnpit−1 = βGC
(
Etlnpit+1 − ιpilnpit
)
− piln(Xt/X) + up,t
where pi =
(1−θpi)(1−βθpi)
θpi
, and Xt represents the price markup and up,t is a cost-push shock. Housing
prices are assumed to be flexible.
Monetary Authority. We assume that the central bank follows a Taylor-type rule as esti-
mated by Iacoviello and Neri (2009)
Rt = R
rR
t−1pi
(1−rR)rpi
t
(
GDPt
GDPt−1
)(1−rR)rY
rr(1−rR)
uR,t
As,t
(2)
where rr is the steady state real interest rate and uR,t is a monetary policy shock. The central
bank’s target is assumed to be time varying and subject to a persistent shock, As,t. GDP is defined
as the sum of consumption and investment at constant prices. Thus,
GDPt = Ct + IKt + qIHt,
where q is real housing prices at the steady state.
Shocks. Productivity in the consumption (Ac,t), investment (Ak,t), and housing sector (Ah,t)
follows
ln(Az,t) = t ln(1 + γAz) + ln(Zz,t),
where γAz are the net growth rates of technology in each sector,
ln(Zz,t) = ρAz ln(Zz,t−1) + uz,t.
uz,t is the innovation and z = {c, k, h} . The inflation target (As,t) and loan-to-value ratio (m)
shocks are assumed to follow an AR(1) process. The cost-push shock (up,t) and the shock to the
policy rule (uR,t) are assumed to be i.i.d. We set the model’s parameters, persistence and standard
deviation of the shocks equal to the mean of the posterior distribution estimated by Iacoviello and
Neri (2010). These values are summarized in Table 1.
We introduce expectations of future macroeconomic developments as in Christiano et al. (2008)
and assume that the error term of the shock consists of an unanticipated component, εz,t, and an
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anticipated change n quarters in advance, εz,t−n,
uz,t = εz,t + εz,t−n,
where εz,t is i.i.d. and z = {c, h, k, p,R, s} . Thus, at time t agents receive a signal about future
macroeconomic conditions at time t+n. If the expected movement doesn’t occur, then εz,t = −εz,t−n
and uz,t = 0.
In addition to expectations on future productivity, we allow in the model for news on several
other shocks as originated in the housing market, the production sector and the conduct of monetary
policy. In particular, we introduce expectations on future productivity (Ac,t+n), on the supply of
houses, (Ah,t+n), on the cost of transforming output into capital, (Ak,t+n), and on the policy rate,
(uR,t+n), on deviations in the central bank inflation target, (As,t) and on inflationary pressures,
(up,t). As shown by Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) these types of expectations that are
not matched generates boom-bust cycles in the housing market characterized by co-movement in
house prices, GDP, consumption, investment, households’ debt and hours worked as in the data.
3 Welfare Analysis
Our paper studies whether interest-rate or macro-prudential policies can achieve macroeconomic
stabilization and improve welfare in the presence of a rich stochastic structure that allows for
both anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Since we assume that the policymaker has the same
information set as private agents, the ex-ante optimal policy is independent of the realization of
expectations. It is plausible to think that LTV and interest-rate rules optimized conditional only
on unfulfilled expectations would be more successful in stabilizing boom-bust cycles. However,
given the difficulty in identifying the source of fluctuations, we find more interesting to characterize
monetary and macro-prudential policy under a mixture of shocks and news that proxies changes
into both current and expected economic conditions. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), we
study ex-ante optimal simple rules based on the second-order approximate solution of the model.
The welfare function is given by the conditional expectations of lifetime utility as of time t:
V it ≡ maxEt
 ∞∑
j=0
βjiU(c
i
t+j , h
i
t+j , n
i
c,t+j , n
i
h,t+j)
 .
Thus, at the optimum
V it = U(c
i
t, c
i
t−1, h
i
t, n
i
c,t, n
i
h,t) + βiEtV
i
t+1,
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where i = {′,′′ } denotes the welfare of the Borrowers and the Savers, respectively. We augment
the set of equilibrium conditions of the model with two equations in two unknowns, V
′
t and V
′′
t .
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Since the rules considered in the paper do not have first-order effects, the deterministic steady state
of the model is the same across the alternative regimes. Nevertheless, different policy regimes are
associated with different stochastic steady states. In order not to neglect welfare effects occurring
during the transition from one stochastic steady state to another, we compute the welfare implied
by the different rules conditional on the initial state being the deterministic steady state. We
explore the welfare performance of operational rules that determine either the interest rate or
the LTV ratio as a function of observable macroeconomic variables. Alternative policy rules are
compared in terms of a consumption equivalent measure, Λi, that would equate welfare V˜ it under
the optimized policy rule to the level of welfare under the deterministic steady state V¯ i where
steady-state consumption is ci(1− Λi):
V˜ it = V¯
i ≡
∞∑
j=0
βjiU((1− Λi)f(ci, ci), hi, nic, nih),
where variables without time subscripts refer to the steady state.
4 Interest-rate Policy
This section analyzes interest-rate rules and their effectiveness in stabilizing the macro-economy
under a rich stochastic structure that includes, among other, current and anticipated shocks to
the policy rate and the central bank inflation target. A high degree of transparency in monetary
policy is likely to reduce the uncertainty about future monetary policy actions and therefore reduce
the occurrence of unfulfilled expectations about the future conduct of monetary policy. In the
following we show that, independently of news about monetary policy, the monetary authority can
affect the size and occurrence of boom-bust cycles stemming from expectations on other types of
future macroeconomic developments by affecting inflationary expectations.
6The results are based on the second-order approximate solution and not conditional on stochastic simulations of
the model. In particular, the second-order approximate solution for the welfare functions, V it , takes a simple form
V it = f(σ
2) , where σ2 is the variance of the shocks. The coefficients on the variance of the shocks depends on the
model’s parameters including the responses in the policy rules.
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4.1 Anti-Inflationary Stance
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 compare the standard deviations of some aggregate and group-specific
variables as delivered by the model under the estimated Taylor rule and a strict anti-inflationary
stance. We assume that, under strict anti-inflationary stance, the monetary authority targets only
inflation and credibly maintains it constant without deviating from the target. Thus, expectations
on the policy rate and the central bank’s target are stabilized. The estimated rule delivers much
lower volatility of all variables, aggregate and individual, relative to a strict anti-inflationary stance.
At the individual level, a strict anti-inflationary stance is accompanied by larger volatility of both
consumption and hours. Column 1 and 2 in Table 3 report the welfare of Savers and Borrowers
under the estimated rule and the strict anti-inflationary stance, respectively. Both Savers and
Borrowers are strictly better off under the estimated rule.
The model we rely on differs from the standard New-Keynesian model in three dimensions:
heterogeneous discount factors, nominal household debt, and news shocks. Monacelli (2006) inves-
tigates the optimal design of monetary policy in a simplified version of the model used in this paper
that abstracts from news shocks. In the presence of technology shocks, the Ramsey equilibrium is
characterized by some inflation volatility. Mendicino and Pescatori (2008) study ex-ante optimal
interest-rate rules under a combination of shocks and show that, in the presence of nominal debt,
monetary policy can avoid the welfare-reducing redistribution generated by nominal contracts by
stabilizing the real interest rate, thereby allowing agents to share risk optimally. Hence, there is a
trade-off between minimizing the distortions generated by nominal price rigidities and those gen-
erated by nominal debt. If the monetary authority completely stabilizes inflation, the uncertainty
related to the real interest rate, namely the real rate of repayment of debt, is larger. In fact, a
strong anti-inflationary stance exacerbates macroeconomic fluctuations because it makes the real
rate extremely volatile. Larger volatility of the real rate means higher uncertainty about the rate
of repayment of the debt and higher volatility of consumption and hours. The presence of news
shocks does not alter this result. In our framework a strict anti-inflationary stance delivers higher
volatility of both housing prices and the loan-to GDP ratio and lower welfare relative to the esti-
mated rule. The rise in volatility is particularly sizable in housing investment and hours worked in
the housing sector. See Table 2.
Figures 1 and 2 analyze the relationship between the standard deviation of inflation and output
as a function of the central bank’s responsiveness to inflation, rpi. The dashed line considers a policy
response to the current inflation rate, pit; the solid line is the response to expected future inflation.
The efficient frontier in Figure 1 confirms the existence of a trade-off between the variability of
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output and that of inflation.7 In other words, an inertial interest-rate rule that targets inflation
and output cannot simultaneously reduce the volatility of GDP and inflation. Figure 2 displays
the standard deviation of several variables with respect to the interest-rate response to inflation,
rpi. A stronger response to deviations of inflation from its target reduces the volatility of inflation
at the cost of increased macroeconomic volatility.
In the presence of news shocks agents face substantial uncertainty about the future development
of the economy. Thus, we assess the gains of responding to expected inflation as a variable that
contains information about the future state of the economy. The efficient frontier shifts inwards
when the monetary authority reacts to expected inflation, as seen in Figure 1. Keeping the standard
deviation of inflation constant, the corresponding decline in the standard deviation of output is
sizable. Hence, monetary policy is slightly more effective if it responds to expected rather than
current inflation. Figure 2 also shows that an interest-rate rule that that responds to expected
rather than current inflation yields lower volatility of GDP and financial variables. However, it
delivers higher volatility of inflation. Targeting expected inflation makes Rt react by more because,
during the boom-phase, movements in future inflation are larger than current inflation. Agents
internalize the stronger reaction in the policy rate and respond to news shocks in a smoother way.
At the same time, the stronger the policy rate reaction, the larger the effect on current inflation
and the higher its standard deviation.
4.2 Targeting Financial Variables
Should the monetary authority react to asset price or credit growth movements to avoid boom-bust
cycles in the financial market? In what follows we assess alternative interest-rate rules that react
to either credit growth or changes in housing prices:
Rt = R
rR
t−1pi
(1−rR)rpi
t
(
GDPt
GDPt−1
)(1−rR)rY ( xt
xt−1
)(1−rR)rx
, (3)
where xt = {bt, qt}. We set rR, ry and rpi equal to the estimated values and allow for positive
responses to the other target, namely rx ≥ 0.
To compare alternative interest-rate rules in a meaningful way, we rely on social welfare criteria.
More precisely, we select the weights of the interest-rate rule on either housing price inflation or
credit growth for which, starting from the estimated rule, i.e. rQ and rB equal to zero, both agents
achieve higher welfare and none of the two agents is worse-off. The resulting interest-rate responses
7Figures 1 and 2 display the standard deviation of some variables with respect to rpi within the range 1.5 to 4.5,
while rY and rR are kept constant and equal to the values estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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are equal to 0.4 and 0.9 for rB and rQ, respectively. These results are based on a second-order
approximation.8 Figure 3 shows that targeting financial variables is welfare improving with respect
to the estimated rule. However, both Borrowers and Savers reach a higher maximum level of welfare
under an interest-rate rule that responds to credit growth.
Figure 4 compares the efficient frontiers. The solid line with dots and the dotted line allow
only for a response to current and expected future inflation, respectively; the solid and dashed lines
allow also for an interest-rate response to variations in housing prices and credit, respectively.9
In comparison with a rule that responds to either current or expected inflation, responding to
financial variables yields significant gains in terms of output and inflation volatility. However,
targeting housing prices improves the output-inflation trade-off to a lesser extent than targeting
credit growth.
Figures 5 and 6 report the transmission of expectations on future productivity and the policy
rate under three alternative interest-rate rules: the estimated rule (starred line); the rule responding
to house price inflation, i.e. rQ equal to 0.9, (dashed line); the rule responding to credit growth, i.e.
rB equal to 0.4, (solid line). These three rules are characterized by different length and magnitude
of macroeconomic boom-bust cycles. First of all, the reaction of housing prices and household debt
is dampened by adding an indicator of potential vulnerabilities in the housing market such as credit
growth or housing price inflation. This also leads to a more contained response of GDP. The same
result holds for other types of expectations of future macroeconomic developments (not shown in
the paper). It is important to stress that boom-bust cycles generated by unfulfilled expectations
are not completely offset by the monetary authority since we characterize optimal monetary under
the assumption that the economy can be hit by both anticipated and unanticipated shocks and
that unmatched expectations are a low probability event. Hence, we do not specifically target the
smoothing of neither some particular types of shocks nor of boom-bust cycles.
All aggregate variables, except inflation, are less volatile under the rule that targets credit
growth relative to the one that targets growth in housing prices, as shown in Table 2. Responding
to credit growth improves upon all interest-rate rules considered here not only in reducing volatility
but also by raising welfare of both groups, as shown in Table 3. Responding to credit growth reduces
the amplitude of the boom and avoids the occurrence of a recession at the end of the bust. Lower
8We start from rQ and rB equal to zero and we increase the response to either targets up to the points in which
both agents are better off. The other parameters are kept constant and equal to the estimated values.
9The efficient frontiers are computed with respect to rpi within the range 1.5 to 4.5. The other parameters are
kept constant and equal to the estimated values, in the case of rY and rR, and to the welfare improving responses
for rB and rQ.
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volatility of household debt is coupled with higher volatility of inflation. However, the welfare
criterion suggest that there is no trade-off between goals of monetary policy and the smoothing of
boom-bust cycles. As suggested earlier, a certain degree of (positive) inflation volatility is optimal
in our model as it helps smoothing out the real effects of changes in nominal debt. To sum up,
an interest-rate rule that responds to credit growth is successful in mitigating boom-bust cycles,
maintaining a stable provision of financial intermediation over the cycle, and improving welfare for
both Savers and Borrowers relative to the estimated interest-rate rule.
5 LTV Ratio Policy
The recent financial crisis, which was ignited by the bursting of the housing bubble in the United
States, has forced central banks to reconsider their policy framework. Should monetary policy
give explicit recognition to financial stability goals? Or should financial stability goals be pursued
by other instruments – such as LTV ratios? We address these questions in the remainder of the
paper. In this section we explore the effectiveness of LTV ratios as macro-prudential tools aimed at
financial and macroeconomic stabilization. The next section compares interest-rate and LTV ratio
rules.
The international policy debate is currently focusing on the design of a macro-prudential policy
whose goal is to moderate credit cycles and to reduce financial imbalances. To this respect, the
Basel Committee on the Global Financial System suggests: (1) the use of instruments “effective
in leaning against both the upswing and the downswing [in the financial cycle]”; (2) the imple-
mentation of “predictable and transparent” policies that are set according to “easily observable
and reliable indicators”; (3) [policies that] “might apply narrowly to sectors where systemically
relevant imbalances are developing”.10 The Committee identified the LTV ratio as one of the
macro-prudential tools that may act as an automatic stabilizer if adjusted in a counter-cyclical
manner.11
In the following we assess the benefits of counter-cyclical LTV ratio rules that imply tighter
financial conditions during booms in the housing market but looser financial conditions during
the busts. In fact, counter-cyclical LTV ratio rules limit leverage in the upswing but broaden
it in the downswing. We compare rules that respond to GDP, credit, and housing price growth
10See Basel Committee on the Global Financial System. 2010. Macro-prudential Instruments and Frameworks: a
Stocktaking of Issues and Experiences. CGFS Publications No 38.
11LTV ratio policies have been already used by Asian Central Banks after the crisis of 1997.
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in moderating the credit and housing cycle and evaluate them in terms of their effectiveness in
stabilizing the macro-economic and in terms of welfare. In practice, we assume
mt = νmmt−1 + (1− νm)m+ (1− νm)νx (xt − xt−1) (4)
where m is the steady state value for the LTV ratio, νm is an autoregressive parameter that
we set equal to 0.5, and νx is the response to alternative observable macroeconomic indicators,
where xt = {bt, qt, GDPt}. νx = 0 corresponds to the case where the LTV ratio does not respond
to the variable chosen as imbalance indicator and macro-prudential policy is non-active. Negative
values of νx make the LTV counter-cyclical because positive growth in the macroeconomic indicator
reduces the LTV ratio and brings a tightening in credit conditions. We measure the effectiveness
of alternative policy rules by looking at the volatility of the loans-to-GDP ratio and welfare. The
analysis conducted in this paper does not aim at designing optimal policies conditional on some
particular shocks, i.e. productivity or financial shocks, but is based on the assumption that various
sources of fluctuations, both anticipated and unanticipated, can affect the economy.
Figure 7 displays the standard deviation of some key macroeconomic variables under LTV rules
targeting credit, GDP, and housing price growth for values of νx between 0 and -7. Three results
emerge. First, all three targeting rules are successful in reducing the volatility of GDP at constant
prices, although the rule targeting credit growth is more effective than the others. Second, the
three rules generate relatively small differences in terms of the volatility of housing prices, housing
investment and inflation. Third, counter-cyclical LTV rules that respond to credit growth are
effective in reducing the volatility of loans and the loan-to-GDP ratio while LTV rules targeting
GDP or housing price growth fail to do so. In fact, the standard deviation of loans and the loan-
to-GDP ratio increases with the responsiveness of the LTV rule to GDP and housing price growth.
The intuition is as follows. LTV rules that target credit growth generate smaller deviations of the
LTV ratio, mt, from its steady state value that effectively dampen the dynamics of credit. Current
shocks or news that, in the absence of counter-cyclical macro-prudential policies, would lead to a
credit boom now cause a reduction of the LTV ratio that remains below steady state while the
credit boom persists. As a result, loans are stabilized. This is not the case for LTV rules that
target GDP or housing price growth. These rules generate stronger instantaneous responses and
non-monotonic dynamics in the LTV ratio than policies that target credit growth and, thus, raise
the volatility of credit. In response to current shocks and news that would generate a housing
boom, these LTV rules reduce mt so much that loans instantaneously fall. This contraction in
credit curtails growth in housing prices and GDP that subsequently raise the LTV ratio, loans,
and the loan-to-GDP ratio above steady state. Hence, responding to GDP or housing price growth
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generates larger volatility in mt and in credit aggregates. Figure 8 displays the impulse response
of the LTV and the loan-to-GDP ratio following a technological shock (left panel) and a monetary
shock (right panel). It is clear that the large response of the LTV ratio under targeting GDP or
house price growth induces large, non-monotonic deviations in credit that raise volatility in the
economy.
Figure 9 shows welfare for Borrowers and Savers under the three alternative LTV rules for a
range of values of νx between 0 and -7. LTV rules that target GDP and housing price growth bring
a welfare improvement for Savers but a welfare worsening for Borrowers. Only LTV rules targeting
credit growth are welfare improving for both groups of consumers. This result is a consequence
of the increased volatility of loans associated with the LTV rules that target GDP and housing
prices growth. Borrowers are credit-constrained and an increase in the volatility of loans implies an
increase in volatility of consumption of both non-durable goods and housing and thereby a lower
welfare for this group of consumers.
6 Monetary versus Macro-prudential Policy
The results presented above assess the contribution of alternative policy strategies aimed at reducing
the occurrence and amplitude of boom-bust cycles in credit and housing prices. Both an interest-
rate rule that directly responds to credit growth and a LTV ratio rule that responds to credit
growth in a counter-cyclical manner are successful in mitigating boom-bust cycles and stabilizing
the provision of credit.
Table 2 shows that, compared to the benchmark estimated economy, both policies reduce sig-
nificantly the volatility of households’ debt but only slightly that of housing prices. However, the
lower volatility of credit and GDP induced by counter-cyclical LTV ratios are not coupled with a
substantial increase in the volatility of inflation as in the case of an interest-rate response to credit
growth.
Table 3 reports the stochastic mean of individual variables in deviation from the steady state.
The first two rows report the stochastic mean for Savers’ and Borrowers’ welfare levels; the other
rows report the percentage point deviation relative to the steady state, with negative numbers
referring to below steady-state values. Savers’ welfare is maximized under an interest-rate response
to credit aggregates that implies lower volatility of consumption in both nondurable goods and
housing services and hours worked, as shown in Table 2. In contrast, Borrowers are better off
under the LTV rule, which leads to a higher level and lower volatility of credit. The welfare
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gain delivered by the LTV ratio rule for Borrowers comes from the level effect rather than the
stabilization effect. Because of higher level of credit, as shown in Table 3, Borrowers experience
higher levels of consumption of both nondurable and housing consumption while slightly lower
levels of hours worked.
Table 4 compares the performance in terms of welfare of the interest-rate and the LTV rule
that responds to credit growth. Savers’ cost is the percentage point reduction in the deterministic
steady-state consumption that equalizes welfare at the deterministic steady state and under the
alternative policy rule. Positive numbers indicate that the consumer is better off at the deterministic
steady state; negative numbers indicate that the consumer is better off under the policy rule under
consideration relative to the deterministic steady state. Notice that negative numbers are possible
because of the presence of credit-constrained individuals. Savers are better off under the interest-
rate rule that responds to credit growth and Borrowers are better off under the LTV rule that
responds to credit growth (as already seen in Table 3). Hence, agent’s heterogeneity fails to provide
us with a uniform ranking among the two policy frameworks. Interestingly, both policies lead to
a Pareto improvement from the starting point of the benchmark policy. Notice, however, that the
welfare gains for each group of agents of adopting their preferred rule relative to the other are small.
7 Conclusions
We analyze the monetary policy implications of expectations-driven cycles. An interest-rate policy
that completely stabilizes inflation fails to mitigate boom-bust cycles. In contrast, an interest-rate
response to credit growth improves macroeconomic and financial stability and welfare. Hence, there
is no trade-off between the goals of monetary policy and the smoothing of boom-bust cycles.
We also investigate the effectiveness of counter-cyclical macro-prudential rules in leaning against
boom-bust cycles. Counter-cyclical LTV rules that respond to credit growth are more effective in
stabilizing credit over the cycle than interest-rate rules that respond to credit growth because they
directly tighten financial conditions during the boom phase and allow easier access to credit during
the bust phase. However, heterogeneity in terms of welfare prevent a clear ranking of the two policy
frameworks.
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Parameters’ Value
Technology ιpi 0.69 m 0.85
µc 0.35 θw,c 0.79 Shocks
µh 0.10 ιw,c 0.08 ρAS 0.975
µl 0.10 θw,h 0.91 ρAC 0.95
µb 0.10 ιw,h 0.40 ρAH 0.997
α 0.79 Preferences ρAK 0.992
φk,c 14.25 ξ 0.66 ρj 0.96
φk,h 10.90 ξ
′
0.97 ρz 0.96
δh 0.01 β 0.9925 ρτ 0.92
δkc 0.025 β
′
0.97 σAC 0.0100
δkh 0.03 j 0.12 σAH 0.0193
X 1.15 ε 0.32 σAK 0.0104
Xwc 1.15 ε
′
0.58 σj 0.0416
Xwh 1.15 η 0.52 σR 0.0034
γAC 0.0032 η
′
0.51 σz 0.0178
γAH 0.0008 Policy στ 0.0254
γAK 0.0027 rR 0.59 σp 0.0046
Stickiness rpi 1.44 σAs 0.0004
θpi 0.83 rY 0.52
Table 1: Parameter Values Estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2009)
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Estimated Rule responding to LTV rule responding to
rule credit growth credit growth
αb = 0.4 vb = −10
Savers’ cost 0.0661 -0.0140 0.04604
Borrowers’ cost -1.5931 -1.7979 -1.8087
All shocks, Second-order Approximation.
Welfare costs are expressed in steady-state consumption-equivalent terms.
Positive figures are costs; negative figures are gains.
Table 4: Welfare Cost
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Figure 1: GDP-Inflation Trade-Off
Figure 2: Standard Deviation w.r.t. the Interest rate response to Inflation
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Figure 3: GDP-Inflation Trade-Off
Figure 4: Standard Deviation w.r.t. the Interest rate response to Inflation
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Figure 7: Standard Deviation (%) w.r.t. Macro-prudential Response to Credit, GDP, or House
Price Growth
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Figure 8: LTV ratio and Debt/GDP responses to alternative LTV ratio rules, νx = −10
Figure 9: Welfare w.r.t. a macroprudential rule response to either credit growth, GDP growth or
house price inflation
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